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Abstract
We present a formal treatment of the Crowd-Anticrowd theory of Mi-
nority Games played by a population of competing agents. This theory is
built around a description of the crowding which arises within the game’s
strategy space. Earlier works have shown that this theory provides a
simple, yet quantitatively accurate explanation of the time-averaged be-
havior of these multi-agent games. We also discuss the extent to which the
Crowd-Anticrowd approach provides a useful tool for analyzing a wider
class of Complex Systems.
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1 Introduction
The now-famous Minority Game (MG) was introduced by Challet and
Zhang [1] as a means of simplifying Brian Arthur’s original El Farol Bar
Problem [2, 3]. The fascination with the MG among researchers from
physics, computer science, biology and economics, has led to the appear-
ance of more than one hundred MG-related papers within the past few
years (see, for example, Refs. [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16,
17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31]). A detailed list, with
informative comments by Damien Challet, is available from Ref. [32]. The
game itself concerns a population of N heterogeneous agents with limited
capabilities and information, who repeatedly compete to be in the minor-
ity group. The agents (e.g. people, cells, data-packets) are adaptive, but
only have access to global information about the game’s progress.
The numerical results obtained by Savit and co-workers [13] prompted
widespread interest in the Minority Game. These results showed that
the time-averaged fluctuations in the game’s output – or equivalently, the
time-averaged fluctuations in wastage of the underlying global resource
– vary in a highly non-linear fashion as a function of the memory m of
the agents. Reference [16] provided the first explanation of this ‘Savit
curve’. In particular it was shown that the formation of, and competi-
tion between, crowds and anticrowds can explain both qualitatively and
quantitatively the Savit curve for the basic MG [16, 17]. In addition, the
Crowd-Anticrowd approach has been shown to describe the fluctuations
within more general MGs: for example, an MG comprising a popula-
tion of agents with different memories m [18, 19], an MG with stochastic
strategy-use [20], and an MG with a mixed population of stochastic and
non-stochastic strategy-use [21]. The task of fully understanding the MG
is seen as an important stepping stone toward the development of a ‘The-
ory of Complex Systems’. Many systems have been proposed as real-world
examples of the MG, in fields as diverse as biology, computing science, so-
ciology, economics and finance. (Note however that the basic MG lacks
the crucial feature present in financial markets whereby agents can sit out
of the game and hence do nothing at any given timestep. Including this
effect yields the Grand Canonical Minority Game (GCMG) as discussed
in Refs. [19, 22], which can indeed show financial market-like behavior).
In addition to the Crowd-Anticrowd approach, there have been various
more recent attempts to develop a quantitative theory which describes the
fluctuations as a function of m in the MG [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 27, 28, 30, 31].
Although elegant and sophisticated, such theories have not been able to
reproduce the numerical results of Ref. [13] over the full range of m. We
believe that what is missing from such theories is an accurate description
of the correlations between agents’ strategies: these correlations produce a
highly-correlated form of decision noise which cannot then be easily aver-
aged over or added in. By contrast these strong inter-strategy correlations
take center-stage in the Crowd-Anticrowd theory.
The Crowd-Anticrowd approach is not limited to MG-like games. It is
built around the effects of crowding (i.e. correlations) in strategy-space,
rather than the precise rules of the game itself, and only makes fairly
modest assumptions about a game’s dynamical behavior. Specifically, its
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validity depends on the histories of the game (see Sec. 2) being visited
reasonably frequently. As a result, it is likely that it is applicable to
other forms of multi-agent game. To the extent that a given Complex
System’s dynamics mimic such a multi-agent game, it is likely that the
Crowd-Anticrowd approach will be applicable. This would be a welcome
development, given the lack of general concepts in the field of Complex
Systems as a whole. It is therefore important to lay out the theoreti-
cal framework underlying the theory, before proceeding with any broader
investigations.
Despite the potential usefulness of the Crowd-Anticrowd theory, the
formal derivation has not yet been presented in the literature. This obser-
vation motivates the present paper. The layout of the paper is as follows.
For completeness, Section 2 provides a description of the basic MG. Sec-
tion 3 presents a derivation of the Crowd-Anticrowd theory, while Section
4 looks at various limiting cases. The conclusion is given in Section 5.
2 Description of the Minority Game
Figure 1 summarizes the Minority Game (MG). At timestep t, each agent
(e.g. a bar customer, a commuter, or a market trader) decides whether
to enter a game where the choices are option 1 (e.g. attend the bar, take
route A, or buy) and option 0 (e.g. go home, take route B, or sell). A
total of n0(t) agents choose 0 while n1(t) choose 1. We can define an
excess demand or net ‘attendance’ as
A(t) = n1(t)− n0(t). (1)
The only global information available to the agents is a common memory
of the recent history, i.e. the most recent m winning decisions/outcomes.
For m = 2, these will have the form 00, 01, 10 or 11. Hence at each
timestep, the recent history constitutes a particular bit-string. For general
m, there will be P = 2m possible history bit-strings. These history bit-
strings can alternatively be represented in decimal form: µ = {0, 1, ..., P −
1} where µ = 0 corresponds to 00, µ = 1 corresponds to 01 etc. A
strategy consists of a response, 0 or 1, to each possible history bit-string.
Hence there are 2P possible strategies. For m = 2 for example, there are
therefore 16 possible strategies. Each agent randomly picks s strategies at
the outset of the game. The agents update the scores of their strategies
after each timestep with +1 (or −1) as the pay-off for choosing the winning
(or losing) action. Agents play their highest scoring strategy. If an agent
holds two or more strategies that are tied for the position of ‘highest
scoring strategy’ then the agent will use a fair random process (e.g. a
coin-toss) to decide which of these strategies to use for that turn of the
game.
A feature of the MG which has attracted much interest, is the standard
deviation (or ‘volatility’) of the number of agents choosing a particular
option over time, i.e. the standard deviation of n0(t) or n1(t) [13]. The
time-averages of n0(t) and n1(t) are both approximately N/2 since neither
0 nor 1 is preferred as an outcome a priori. Only those agents who choose
the correct minority option at a given turn get positively rewarded, hence
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the standard deviation of n0(t) or n1(t) (and A(t)) indicates the level of
wastage in the system. If the standard deviation of n0(t) is small then
a relatively large proportion of agents are getting rewarded positively at
each timestep, and hence the level of wastage |n0(t)−N/2| is small. Con-
versely, if the standard deviation of n0(t) is large then a relatively small
proportion of agents are getting rewarded positively at each timestep, and
hence the level of wastage |n0(t)−N/2| is large.
Figure 2 shows the ‘Savit curve’. This plots the standard deviation
(i.e. volatility) of agents choosing a particular option, as a function of
memory size m. The numerical values are shown as small circles, and
were obtained from individual simulation runs. The data for each run is
collected once initial transient effects have settled down. The volatilities
from different runs differ because of different initial strategy allocations
among the agents, and different outcomes from the coin-tosses used to
break ties in strategy scores. The dashed line represents the volatility one
would get if all the agents used the toss of a coin to decide which option
to choose at every timestep. To see how this is calculated, consider the
case of N independent agents each deciding which option to choose by
the toss of a coin. Each agent therefore provides a random-walk process
in terms of increasing or decreasing A(t) by 1. Assume for the moment
that these coin-tosses are uncorrelated. Then the total variance of this
random-walk in the attendance A(t), is given by the sum of the individual
variances produced by each of the N agents. If the agent decides 1, then
he contributes 1 to the attendance A(t). [The random-walk “step-size” is
d = 1]. If, by contrast, the agent decides 0, then he contributes −1 to the
attendance A(t). The agent chooses 1 with probability p = 1/2, and 0
with probability q = 1/2. The variance contributed to σ2 by each agent is
therefore given by the random-walk result 4pqd2 = 1. Summing over all N
agents, the total variance in the excess demand is given by 4Npqd2 = N .
The variance σ21 of n1(t) can be obtained from the variance σ
2 of A(t)
by dividing by a factor 4 [since 2σ1 = σ]. Hence the variance σ
2
1 of n1(t)
is given by N/4. The corresponding standard deviation σ1 =
√
N/2 is
the dashed ‘coin-toss’ line in the plot (i.e. σ1 ≈ 5.0 for N = 101). The
solid lines in Figure 2 correspond to analytic Crowd-Anticrowd results
calculated in various regimes: these are discussed later in the paper.
2.1 Strategy Space
A strategy is defined as a set of instructions to describe what an agent
should do in any given situation, i.e. given any particular history µ the
strategy decides what the agent should do. The strategy space is the
set of strategies from which agents are allocated their strategies at the
beginning of the game. Any strategy in the strategy space can in principle
be present in the game: however if a strategy is not in the set which
is initially allocated, then it can never appear in that particular run of
the MG game. Figure 3 shows an m = 2 strategy space together with
some example strategies. The strategy space shown is known as the ‘Full
Strategy Space’, FSS, and contains all possible permutations of the binary
options 0 and 1 for each history. As such there are 22
m
strategies in this
space. The 2m dimensional hypercube shows all 22
m
strategies from the
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full strategy space at its vertices. It is clear that the agents playing the
game are limited by the set of strategies that they are allocated at the
start of the game. (This initial strategy-allocation is random). Of course
there are many more strategies that can be thought of, but which aren’t
present within the FSS. For example, the simple strategies of persistence
and anti-persistence are not present in the FSS. The advantage however
of using the FSS in the MG is that the strategies form a complete set and
as such display no bias towards any option given a history. There are also
practical reasons for using a binary strategy space. Consider a game with
a memory size of m = 8, i.e. the agents can look at the last 8 outcomes
of the game to decide what to do next. Even with binary options for a
given history there are a large number of strategies – in particular there are
22
m
= 1.16×1077. To include any additional strategies like persistence and
anti-persistence would mean opening up the strategy space, hence losing
the simplicity of the MG and returning to the complexity of Arthur’s
original Bar Problem [2, 3].
2.2 Reduced Strategy Space (RSS)
It can be observed from the FSS, that one can choose a subset of strate-
gies [4] such that any pair within this subset has one of the following
characteristics:
• anti-correlated, e.g. 0000 and 1111. For example, any two agents
using the (m = 2) strategies 0000 and 1111 respectively, would take
the opposite action irrespective of the sequence of previous outcomes
and hence the history. Hence one agent will always do the opposite of
the other agent. For example, if one agent buys at a given timestep,
the other agent will sell. Their net effect on the attendance A(t)
therefore cancels out at each timestep. Hence they will not con-
tribute to fluctuations in A(t). In short they do not contribute to
the volatility. This is a crucial observation for understanding the
behaviour of the volatility in this system, as we discuss later on.
• uncorrelated, e.g. 0000 and 0011. For example, any two agents using
the strategies 0000 and 0011 respectively, would take the opposite
action for two of the four histories, while they would take the same
action for the remaining two histories. Assuming that the m = 2
histories occur equally often, the actions of the two agents will be
uncorrelated on average.
A convenient measure of the distance (i.e. closeness) of any two strate-
gies is the Hamming distance which is defined by the number of bits
that need to be changed in going from one strategy to another. For
example, the Hamming distance between 0000 and 1111 is 4, while the
Hamming distance between 0000 and 0011 is just 2. Although there are
2P ≡ 22m=2 ≡ 16 strategies in the m = 2 strategy space, it can be seen
that one can choose subsets such that any strategy-pair within this subset
is either anti-correlated or uncorrelated. Consider, for example, the two
groups
Um=2 ≡ {0000, 1100, 1010, 0110}
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and
Um=2 ≡ {1111, 0011, 0101, 1001}.
Any two strategies within Um=2 are uncorrelated since they have a Ham-
ming distance of 2. Likewise any two strategies within Um=2 are uncor-
related since they have a relative Hamming distance of 2. However, each
strategy in Um=2 has an anti-correlated strategy in Um=2: for example,
0000 is anti-correlated to 1111, 1100 is anti-correlated to 0011 etc. This
subset of strategies comprising Um=2 and Um=2 , forms a Reduced Strat-
egy Space (RSS) [4]. Since it contains the essential correlations of the Full
Strategy Space (FSS), it turns out that running the simulation within the
RSS reproduces the main features of the full game obtained using the FSS
[4]. The RSS has a smaller number of strategies 2.2m = 2P ≡ 2m+1 than
the FSS which has 2P = 22
m
. For m = 2, there are 8 strategies in the
RSS, compared to 16 in the FSS, whilst for m = 8 there are 1.16 × 1077
strategies in the FSS, but only 512 strategies in the RSS. We note that the
choice of the RSS is not unique, i.e. within a given FSS there are many
possible choices for a RSS. In particular, it is possible to create 22
m
/2m+1
distinct reduced strategy spaces from the FSS. To summarize, the RSS
provides a minimal set of strategies which ‘span’ the FSS and are hence
representative of its full structure.
2.3 History Space: de Bruijn graph
The history µ of recent outcomes changes in time, i.e. it is a dynamical
variable. Interestingly the dynamics of this history can be represented on
a directed graph (a so-called digraph). The particular form of directed
graph is called a de Bruijn graph. Figure 4 shows some examples of the
de Bruijn graph for m = 1, 2, and 3. The probability that the outcome
at time t + 1 will be a 1 (or 0) depends on the state at time t. Hence it
will depend on the previous m outcomes, i.e. it depends on the particular
state of the history bit-string. The dependence on earlier timesteps means
that the game is non-Markovian. We note that modifying the game to a
finite time-horizon for scoring strategies, allows the resulting game to be
viewed as a high-dimensional Markov process [23, 24]. However, here we
focus on the basic MG where scores are kept from the beginning of the
game.
2.4 Initial conditions for the MG
The dynamics for a particular run of the game depend upon the strategies
that the agents are initially assigned and the random process used to de-
cide tie-breaks. The particular dynamics which emerge also depend upon
the initial score-vector of the strategies and initial history used to seed
the start of the game. If the initial strategy score-vector is not ‘typical’,
then a bias can be introduced into the game which never disappears. In
short, the system never recovers from this bias. It will be assumed that
no such initial bias exists. In practice this is achieved, for example, by
setting all the initial scores to zero. The initial choice of history is not
considered to be an important effect. It is assumed that any transient ef-
fects resulting from the particular history seed will have disappeared, i.e.
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the initial history seed does not introduce any long-term bias. A typical
game is left to run for over 10, 000 timesteps such that any transients are
washed out of the system.
The initial strategy allocation among agents can be described in terms
of a tensor Ω [25]. This tensor Ω describes the distribution of strategies
among theN individual agents and hence the particular quenched disorder
of the system. The dimension of Ω is given by the number of strategies s
that each agent holds. For example, for s = 3 the element Ωi,j,k gives the
number of agents assigned strategy i, then strategy j, and then strategy
k, in that order. Hence
D∑
i,j,k,...
Ωi,j,k,... = N, (2)
where the value ofD represents the number of distinct strategies that exist
within the strategy space chosen. D = 22
m
in the FSS, whilst D = 2.2m
in the RSS. Figure 5 shows an example distribution Ω for N = 101 agents
in the case of m = 2, and s = 2 in the reduced strategy space RSS. We
note that while Ω is not symmetric, it could be made so since the MG
does not distinguish between the order in which the two strategies are
picked.
3 Derivation of Crowd-Anticrowd theory
3.1 Qualitative explanation
We start by providing a qualitative explanation of the ‘Savit curve’ in
Figure 2 (small circles). Our explanation is based on the RSS, but we
note that Figure 2 is practically identical for both RSS and FSS. First
we introduce the notion of crowd and anticrowd. Consider a group of
agents whose highest-scoring strategy is R over δt timesteps. This group
constitutes a crowd since they all use this same strategy R and hence
act in the same way for those δt timesteps regardless of the particular
history bit-string at each timestep. Next consider the group of agents
whose highest-scoring strategy over the same δt timesteps is the anti-
correlated partner to R, which we refer to as R. This group constitutes
an anticrowd with respect to the crowd using strategy R, since they will
act in the opposite way to the first crowd at each timestep regardless of
the particular history bit-string.
Figure 6 indicates the competition between crowd-anticrowd sizes which
arises as a function ofm. The curve in the upper graph shows the volatility
from Figure 2 averaged over runs, as a function of m. The low-m phase,
characterized by a decrease in σ as m increases, is called the crowded
phase since the number of strategies in the RSS 2m+1 is small compared
to the number of agents N . The high-m phase, characterized by a slow
increase in σ towards a limiting value as m increases, is called the di-
lute phase since the number of strategies in the RSS 2m+1 is now large
compared to the number of agents N .
In the crowded phase, i.e. at small m, there will at any one time be
a large number of agents who are using a given strategy R and so will
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flood into the market as a crowd. Although the crowd may maintain
strategy R for several timesteps, the resulting outcome will tend to flip
between 0 and 1 in response to the changing history bit-string (consider,
for example, strategy 0011 which produces equal numbers of 0’s and 1’s
as the game cycles through history bit-strings). This gives rise to a high
volatility. Eventually, strategy R will lose enough points to be deemed
a bad strategy by many of the crowd members. Hence the crowd using
a given strategy R is continually changing its membership and size. We
emphasize that the crowding effect we are discussing at any given timestep
will occur regardless of the actual history bit-string at that timestep, since
it is a crowding effect in strategy space rather than merely a crowding in
terms of eventual action. In other words, we are not just making the trivial
statement that a crowd comprises agents who act in the same way at a
given timestep – instead we are saying that a crowd is characterized by
agents who all believe that a given strategy is the best, and will therefore
take the same action regardless of the history bit-string at a particular
timestep.
As the memory m of the agents increases, the number of agents using
high-scoring strategies tends to decrease simply because many may not
now possess such strategies. This implies a decrease in the crowd-sizes,
but an increase in the number of crowds reflecting an increase in the
number of strategies available. There will also be groups of agents who
are forced to use the anti-correlated (i.e. low-scoring) strategies. The
actions of these anticrowds will cancel out the action of the crowds. This
argument applies to all pairs of anti-correlated strategies, i.e. the crowd-
anticrowd pair corresponding to the best/worst strategy pair, the crowd-
anticrowd pair corresponding to the second-best/second-worst strategy
pair, etc. As m increases, the crowd-sizes decrease while the anticrowd
sizes increase: this yields an increase in the crowd-anticrowd cancellation
effect and hence a reduction in the size of the volatility. Eventually in the
dilute phase of very large memory m, it is very unlikely that any agents
will use (or even hold) the same strategies. It is also unlikely that any two
agents will be using anti-correlated strategies. Hence the crowd-anticrowd
cancellation is reduced, thereby increasing the volatility. Because of the
lack of correlated groups (i.e. all crowds and anticrowds are of size 1 or
0) the volatility can now be modelled by assuming that the population
comprises independent, coin-tossing agents.
We now add some analytics to this verbal description. Consider the
crowd of agents nR using a particular strategy R at a particular mo-
ment during the game, and the anticrowd of nR agents who are using the
anticorrelated strategy to R. Over the timescale during which the two op-
posing strategies are being played, the fluctuations are determined only by
the net crowd-size neffR = nR − nR which constitutes the net step-size of
the crowd-anticrowd pair in a random-walk model for the attendance. The
net contribution to the volatility by this crowd-anticrowd pair is therefore
pqd2 = [neffR ]
2/4. This simple expression enables us to discuss the order
of magnitude of the volatility within the three main regions of the curve
seen in Figure 2:
• 2m+1 << N.s : suppose strategy R∗ is the highest scoring at a
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particular moment. The anti-correlated strategy R∗ is therefore the
lowest scoring at that same moment. In the limit of small m, the
size of the strategy space is small. Each agent hence carries a con-
siderable fraction of all possible strategies. Therefore, even if an
agent picks R∗ among his s strategies, he is also likely to have a
high scoring strategy. Therefore, many agents will choose to use ei-
ther R∗ itself (if they hold it) or a similar one. In this regime the
crowd associated with the highest-scoring strategies will dominate.
Therefore nR ∼ NδRR∗ and hence n
eff
R ∼ NδRR∗ . This implies that
the variance varies as N2/4, i.e. the volatility is σ ∼ N/2 = 50 for
N = 101.
• 2m+1 >> N.s : in the limit of large m, the strategy space is very
large and agents will have a low chance of holding the same strategy.
Even if an agent has several low-scoring strategies, the probability
of his best strategy being strictly anticorrelated to another agent’s
best strategy (hence forming a crowd-anticrowd pair) is small. All
the crowds and anticrowds will tend to be of size 1 or 0, hence there
are of order N contributions to the variance, each with effective step-
size neffR = 1. This implies that the variance varies as N [n
eff
R ]
2/4 =
N/4, i.e. the volatility is σ ∼ √N/2 = 5 for N = 101.
• 2m+1 ∼ N.s : in the intermediate m region where the numerical
minimum exists, the size of the strategy space is relatively large.
Hence some agents may get stuck with s strategies which are all low
scoring. They hence form anticrowds. Considering the extreme case
where the crowd and anticrowd are of similar size, this gives neffR ∼ 0
and hence the volatility σ → 0. For a fixed value of m, this regime of
small volatility will arise for small s since, in this case, the number of
strategies available to each agent is small - hence some of the agents
may indeed be forced to use a strategy which is little better than
the poorly-performing R∗. In other words, the cancellation effect of
the crowd and anticrowd becomes most effective in this intermediate
region for small s. Increasing s will make this minimum less marked
since it will reduce the number of agents forced to use the anti-
correlated strategy, hence reducing the crowd-anticrowd cancellation
effect in the volatility (as shown later in Figure 11).
We note that this Crowd-Anticrowd concept, and the subsequent detailed
theory presented below, does not use any knowledge of the specific history
bit-string at a given time-step. Hence the theory does not depend on the
detailed dynamics of the history bit-string, as long as the dynamics is such
that all histories (i.e. nodes in the de Bruijn graph) are visited frequently
thereby guaranteeing that the measure of correlation for strategy pairs
will have meaning. Hence the crowd-anticrowd theory would predict the
same volatility for the MG regardless of whether the real history was used
at each timestep, or whether it was replaced by a random bit-string. This
is indeed what has been found in numerical studies of the volatility by
Cavagna [29], thereby establishing the usefulness of the Crowd-Anticrowd
approach.
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3.2 Proof of concept
Having given a qualitative understanding of the underlying physics, we
will now provide a numerical proof-of-concept of the Crowd-Anticrowd
approach before giving a formal derivation of the theory itself. Consider
a given realization of the quenched disorder Ω and a timestep t in a given
run for this given Ω. There is a current score-vector S[t] and a cur-
rent history µ[t] which define the state of the game. The attendance
A(t) = A [S[t], µ[t]] is given by Equation 1. The volatility for a given run
corresponds to a time-average: it is the standard deviation of the number
of agents making a given decision (e.g. 1) for a given realization of the
quenched disorder Ω and a given set of initial conditions. The volatility
will eventually be averaged over many runs, and hence will be averaged
over all realizations of the quenched disorder Ω and all sets of initial condi-
tions. However, consider first a given realization of the quenched disorder
Ω. We will assume that the quantities of interest (i.e. the mean and stan-
dard deviation of the attendance A(t), and hence also n1(t) and n0(t))
self-average for a given realization of the quenched disorder Ω. In other
words, it is assumed that the average over time is equivalent to an average
over initial conditions for the given realization of the quenched disorder
Ω. We have checked using numerical simulations that this assumption is
valid. The attendance in Equation 1 can be rewritten by summing over
the RSS as follows:
A [S[t], µ[t]] = n1(t)− n0(t) ≡
2P∑
R=1
a
µ[t]
R n
S[t]
R , (3)
where P = 2m and the quantity a
µ[t]
R is the response of strategy R to the
history bit-string µ at time t. Option 1 corresponds to a
µ[t]
R = 1 while
option 0 corresponds to a
µ[t]
R = −1. The quantity nS[t]R is the number of
agents using strategy R at time t. [The superscript S[t] is a reminder
that this number of agents will depend on the strategy score at time t].
The calculation of the average attendance will now be shown, where the
average is over time for a given realization of the quenched disorder Ω.
〈X(t)〉t is defined as a time-average over the variable X(t) for a given
Ω. By assuming the self-averaging property for a given Ω, the system is
essentially assumed to be ergodic: hence we can assume that all histories
will be visited with similar frequency in a given run. Hence
〈A [S[t], µ[t]]〉t =
2P∑
R=1
〈
a
µ[t]
R n
S[t]
R
〉
t
(4)
=
2P∑
R=1
〈
a
µ[t]
R
〉
t
〈
n
S[t]
R
〉
t
=
2P∑
R=1
(
1
P
P−1∑
µ=0
a
µ[t]
R
)〈
n
S[t]
R
〉
t
=
2P∑
R=1
0.
〈
n
S[t]
R
〉
t
= 0.
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Notice that the averaging is performed over all the histories, because of
the ergodic assumption. The interest is in the fluctuations of A(t) about
this average value. Hence the volatility of A(t) is considered. The variance
(or volatility squared) is given by
σ2Ω =
〈
A [S[t], µ[t]]2
〉
t
− 〈A [S[t], µ[t]]〉2t (5)
=
〈
A [S[t], µ[t]]2
〉
t
=
2P∑
R,R′=1
〈
a
µ[t]
R n
S[t]
R a
µ[t]
R′ n
S[t]
R′
〉
t
.
This double sum is now broken into three parts: aR.aR′ = P (correlated),
aR.aR′ = −P (anti-correlated), and aR.aR′ = 0 (uncorrelated). While
this cannot be done in the FSS, the decomposition is exact in the RSS.
Hence we have
σ2Ω =
2P∑
R=1
〈(
a
µ[t]
R
)2 (
n
S[t]
R
)2〉
t
+
2P∑
R=1
〈
a
µ[t]
R a
µ[t]
R
n
S[t]
R n
S[t]
R
〉
t
+
2P∑
R 6=R′ 6=R
〈
a
µ[t]
R a
µ[t]
R′ n
S[t]
R n
S[t]
R′
〉
t
=
2P∑
R=1
〈(
n
S[t]
R
)2
− nS[t]R nS[t]R
〉
t
+
2P∑
R 6=R′ 6=R
〈
a
µ[t]
R a
µ[t]
R′
〉
t
〈
n
S[t]
R n
S[t]
R′
〉
t
(6)
=
2P∑
R=1
〈(
n
S[t]
R
)2
− nS[t]R nS[t]R
〉
t
+
2P∑
R 6=R′ 6=R
(
1
P
P−1∑
µ=0
a
µ[t]
R a
µ[t]
R′
)〈
n
S[t]
R n
S[t]
R′
〉
t
=
2P∑
R=1
〈(
n
S[t]
R
)2
− nS[t]R nS[t]R
〉
t
.
This sum over 2P terms can however be written as a sum over P terms,
σ2Ω =
2P∑
R=1
〈(
n
S[t]
R
)2
− nS[t]R nS[t]R
〉
t
(7)
=
P∑
R=1
〈(
n
S[t]
R
)2
− nS[t]R nS[t]R +
(
n
S[t]
R
)2
− nS[t]
R
n
S[t]
R
〉
t
=
P∑
R=1
〈(
n
S[t]
R
)2
− 2nS[t]R nS[t]R +
(
n
S[t]
R
)2〉
t
=
P∑
R=1
〈(
n
S[t]
R − nS[t]R
)2〉
t
≡
〈
P∑
R=1
(
n
S[t]
R − nS[t]R
)2〉
t
.
All the above is for a given realization of the quenched disorder Ω. The
values of n
S[t]
R and n
S[t]
R
for each R will depend on the precise form of Ω.
We will now proceed to consider the ensemble-average over all possi-
ble realizations of quenched disorder. The ensemble-average is denoted
as 〈...〉Ω, and for simplicity the notation
〈
σ2Ω
〉
Ω
= σ2 is defined. This
ensemble-average is performed on either side of Equation 7,
σ2 =
〈〈
P∑
R=1
(
n
S[t]
R − nS[t]R
)2〉
t
〉
Ω
(8)
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yielding the volatility in the attendance A(t). However as in Figure 2,
the numerical simulations are typically performed for the volatility of the
number of traders choosing option 1 (e.g. buy). Fortunately a simple
relationship can be derived between the two as follows. Going back to the
original definitions given for the attendance (Equation 1) and substituting
into Equation 5, gives
σ2 =
〈〈
[n1(t)− n0(t)]2
〉
t
〉
Ω
. (9)
It is known that the total number of traders N = n1(t) + n0(t), hence
σ2 =
〈〈
[2n1(t)−N ]2
〉
t
〉
Ω
. (10)
By the symmetry of the game however, it is expected that
〈〈[n1(t)]〉t〉Ω = 〈〈[n0(t)]〉t〉Ω = N2 (11)
and hence
σ2 =
〈〈[
2n1(t)− 2
〈〈
[n1(t)]
2〉
t
〉
Ω
]2〉
t
〉
Ω
(12)
= 4
〈〈[
n1(t)−
〈〈
[n1(t)]
2〉
t
〉
Ω
]2〉
t
〉
Ω
= 4σ21 .
This leaves the result that the ensemble and time-averaged volatility of
the number of agents choosing a given option is given by σ1, where
σ21 =
1
4
〈〈
P∑
R=1
(
n
S[t]
R − nS[t]R
)2〉
t
〉
Ω
. (13)
Equation 13 is an important intermediary result for the Crowd-Anticrowd
theory. Before proceeding to treat it analytically, it is important to eval-
uate it numerically to see how well it describes the numerical results of
the Savit curve. If this is successful, we will have provided a proof-of-
concept of the Crowd-Anticrowd approach. In particular, it will give us
confidence that the Crowd-Anticrowd approach hasn’t thrown out any of
the essential physics so far, and reassure us that it is worth proceeding
with an analytic evaluation of Equation 13.
Figure 7 confirms that the Crowd-Anticrowd theory of Equation 13
does indeed work. The solid curves represent the ensemble and time-
averaged standard deviation of the number of agents choosing a given
option, obtained by recording the number of agents choosing option 1 at
every timestep. The dashed curves show the ensemble and time-averaged
standard deviation calculated using Equation 13. (For the purpose of
calculation, the numbers of agents using each R’th ranked strategy were
recorded at each timestep for 1000 turns of the game after initial transient
effects had died down. The volatility for a run of the game was hence
calculated over this time period. Finally an average was taken over 16
runs of the game to simulate the configuration averaging in Equation 13).
As can be seen from Figure 7, the results show that Equation 13 captures
the essential physics underlying the fluctuations in the Minority Game.
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3.3 Quantitative theory
Equation 13 provides us with an exact theory for the time-averaged fluc-
tuations in the MG. However some form of approximation must be intro-
duced in order to reduce Equation 13 to an analytic expression. It turns
out that Equation 13 can be manipulated in a variety of ways, depending
on the level of approximation that one is prepared to make. The precise
form of any resulting analytic expression will obviously depend on the
details of the approximations made.
In this Section, we will approach the problem of evaluating Equa-
tion 13 analytically by first relabelling strategies. Specifically, the sum in
Equation 13 is re-written to be over a virtual-point ranking K and not the
decimal form R. Consider the variation in points for a given strategy, as
a function of time for a given realization of the quenched disorder Ω. Fig-
ure 8 provides a schematic representation of how the scores of three such
strategies, and their three anti-correlated strategies, might vary in time
(particularly for lower m). The ranking (i.e. label) of a given strategy in
terms of virtual-points score is changing all the time since the individual
strategies have a variation in virtual-points which varies rapidly (see e.g.
the black curve in Figure 8). This implies that the specific identity of the
‘n’th highest-scoring strategy’ is changing all the time. It also implies that
n
S[t]
R is changing rapidly in time. In order to proceed, we shift the focus
onto the time-evolution of the highest-scoring strategy, second highest-
scoring strategy etc. This has a much smoother time-evolution than the
time-evolution for a given strategy SR[t]. In short, the focus is shifted
from the time-evolution of the points of a given strategy (i.e. from SR[t]
) to the time-evolution of the points of the n’th highest scoring strategy
(i.e. to SK [t]). From this point of view, Figure 8 should now be viewed in
terms of virtual-point ranking K. Figure 9 is a schematic representation
of how the scores of the two top scoring strategies from Figure 8 vary,
using the new virtual-point ranking scheme. The label K is used to de-
note the rank in terms of strategy score, i.e. K = 1 is the highest scoring
strategy position, K = 2 is the second highest-scoring strategy position
etc. with
SK=1 > SK=2 > SK=3 > SK=4 > ... (14)
A given strategy, e.g. 0000, may at a given timestep have label K = 1,
while a few timesteps later have label K = 5. Because it is known that
SR = −SR (i.e. strategy scores start off all at zero), then we know that
SK = −SK . Equation 13 can hence be rewritten exactly as
σ21 =
1
4
〈〈
P∑
K=1
(
n
S[t]
K − nS[t]K
)2〉
t
〉
Ω
. (15)
Note that the quantities n
S[t]
K and n
S[t]
K
will fluctuate in time, but far less
so than the individual strategy quantities n
S[t]
R and n
S[t]
R
in Equation 13.
As can be seen from Figure 9 (e.g. black curve), the time-evolution of
the strategy scores is such that the points for a given K tend to fluctuate
around a mean value. It is now assumed that the spread in traders across
the strategy space is fairly uniform, i.e. Ω is a fairly uniform matrix. This
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will be reasonable for small m. Hence it is expected that the number
of traders playing the strategy in position K at any timestep t, will also
fluctuate around some mean value:
n
S[t]
K = nK + εK(t), (16)
where εK(t) is assumed to be a white noise term with zero mean and small
variance. Here nK is the mean value. Hence,
σ21 =
1
4
〈
P∑
K=1
〈
[nK + εK(t)− nK − εK(t)]2
〉
t
〉
Ω
(17)
=
1
4
〈
P∑
K=1
〈
[(nK − nK) + (εK(t)− εK(t))]2
〉
t
〉
Ω
=
1
4
〈
P∑
K=1
〈
[nK − nK ]2 + [εK(t)− εK(t)]2 + [2(nK − nK)(εK(t)− εK(t))]
〉
t
〉
Ω
≈
1
4
〈
P∑
K=1
〈
[nK − nK ]2
〉
t
〉
Ω
=
1
4
〈
P∑
K=1
[nK − nK ]2
〉
Ω
,
since the latter two terms involving noise will average out to be small. The
resulting expression involves no time dependence. The averaging over Ω
can then be taken inside the sum. The individual terms in the sum, i.e.〈
[nK − nK ]2
〉
Ω
, are just an expectation value of a function of two variables
nK and nK . Each term can therefore be rewritten exactly using the joint
probability distribution for nK and nK , which we shall call P (nK , nK).
Hence,
σ21 =
1
4
P∑
K=1
〈
[nK − nK ]2
〉
Ω
(18)
=
1
4
P∑
K=1
N∑
nK=0
N∑
n
K
=0
[nK − nK ]2 P (nK , nK),
where the standard probability result involving functions of two variables
has been used. So how can we evaluate Equation 18? In general, it will
depend on the detailed form of the joint probability function P (nK , nK)
which in turn will depend on the ensemble of quenched disorders {Ω}
which are being averaged over.
We will start off by looking at Equation 18 in the limiting case where
the averaging over the quenched disorder matrix is dominated by the
matrices Ω which are nearly flat. This will be a good approximation for
small m since in this limit the standard deviation of an element in Ω (i.e.
the standard deviation in bin-size) is much smaller than the mean bin-size.
In this limiting case, there are several nice features:
• in addition to the ranking in terms of virtual-points, i.e. SK=1 >
SK=2 > SK=2 > SK=2 > ... (this holds by definition of the labels
{K}), we will also have
nK=1 > nK=2 > nK=2 > nK=2 > ...
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[Note that the ordering in terms of the labels {R} would not be se-
quential, i.e. it is not true that nR=1 > nR=2 > nR=2 > nR=2 > ...]
Hence the rankings in terms of highest virtual-points and popularity
are identical.
• it is guaranteed that the strategy K, which is anticorrelated to strat-
egy K, occupies position K = 2P +1−K in this popularity-ranked
list.
• the probability distribution P (nK , nK) will be sharply peaked around
the nK and nK values given by the expected values for a flat quenched-
disorder matrix Ω. We will call these values nK and nK .
The last point implies that P (nK , nK) ∝ δ(nK − nK)δ(nK − nK) and so
σ21 =
1
4
P∑
K=1
[nK − nK ]2 . (19)
We note that there is a very simple interpretation of Equation 19. It
represents the sum of the variances for each crowd-anticrowd pair. For a
given strategy K there is an anticorrelated strategy K. The nK agents
using strategy K are doing the opposite to the nK agents using strategy
K irrespective of the history bit-string. Hence the effective group-size for
each crowd-anticrowd pair is neffK = nK − nK : this represents the net
step-size d of the crowd-anticrowd pair in a random-walk contribution to
the total variance. Hence, the net contribution by this crowd-anticrowd
pair to the variance is given by
[σ21 ]KK =
1
4
[σ2]KK =
1
4
.4pqd2 = pqd2 (20)
=
[neffK ]
2
4
=
1
4
[nK − nK ]2 .
where p = q = 1/2 for a random walk. Since all the strong correlations
have been removed (i.e. anti-correlations) it can be happily assumed that
the separate crowd-anticrowd pairs execute random walks which are un-
correlated with respect to each other. [Recall the properties of the RSS -
all the remaining strategies are uncorrelated]. Hence the total variance is
given by the sum of the individual variances,
σ21 =
P∑
K=1
[σ21 ]KK =
1
4
P∑
K=1
[nK − nK ]2 , (21)
which corresponds exactly to Equation 19.
4 Limiting cases of Crowd-Anticrowd
theory
4.1 Flat quenched disorder matrix Ω, low m
Explicit expressions for the case of a flat quenched disorder matrix Ω can
now be calculated. In this limit each element of Ω has a mean of N/(2P )s
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agents per ‘bin’. For the case s = 2, the expected number of traders whose
highest scoring strategy is the strategy occupying position K at timestep
t, will therefore be given by summing the appropriate rows and columns of
this quenched disorder matrix Ω. The matrix Ω is flat, so any re-ordering
has no effect on the form of the matrix. Figure 10 provides a schematic
representation of Ω with m = 2, s = 2, in the RSS. These strategies are
now ranked according to the value of K. The shaded elements represent
those agents which hold a strategy that is ranked 4’th highest in score,
i.e. K = 4. Any trader using the strategy in position K = 4 cannot have
any strategy with a higher position, by definition of the rules of the game.
(The traders use their highest scoring strategy). Hence the traders using
the strategy in position K = 4 must lie in one of the shaded bins. Since it
is assumed that the coverage of the bins is uniform, the expected number
of agents using the strategy in position K = 4 is given by
nK=4 = N.
1
(2P )2
∑
(shaded bins) (22)
= N.
1
64
.[(8− 3) + (8− 3)− 1]
=
9
64
N.
For more general m and s values this becomes
nK =
N
(2P )s
[s(2P −K)s−1 + s(s− 1)
2
(2P −K)s−2 + ...+ 1] (23)
=
N
(2P )s
s−1∑
r=0
s!
(s− r)!r! [2P −K]
r
=
N
(2P )s
([2P −K + 1]s − [2P −K]s)
= N.
([
1− (K − 1)
2P
]s
−
[
1− K
2P
]s)
,
with P ≡ 2m. In the case where each agent holds two strategies, s = 2,
nK can be simplified to
nK = N.
([
1− (K − 1)
2P
]2
−
[
1− K
2P
]2)
(24)
=
(2m+2 − 2K + 1)
22(m+1)
N.
Similarly for nK the simplification is as follows:
nK =
(2m+2 − 2K + 1)
22(m+1)
N (25)
=
(2K − 1)
22(m+1)
N,
where the relation K = 2P − K + 1 ≡ 2m+1 − K + 1 is used. It is
emphasized that these results depend on the assumption that the averages
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are dominated by the effects of flat distributions for the quenched disorder
matrix Ω, and hence will only be quantitatively valid for low m.
Using Equations 24 and 25 in Equation 19 gives
σ21 =
1
4
P∑
K=1
[
(2m+2 − 2K + 1)
22(m+1)
N − (2K − 1)
22(m+1)
N
]2
(26)
=
N2
24(m+1)
P∑
K=1
[2m+1 − 2K + 1]2
=
N2
3.2m+2
(1− 2−2(m+1)),
and hence
σdelta f1 =
N√
3.2
m
2
+1
(1− 2−2(m+1)) 12 , (27)
which is valid for small m. Numerical results show that this is indeed the
case. (The rationale behind the choice of superscript will become apparent
shortly.)
4.2 Non-flat quenched disorder Ω at low m
The appearance of a significant number of non-flat quenched disorder
matrices Ω in the ensemble, implies that the standard deviation for each
‘bin’ is now significant, i.e. non-negligible compared to the mean. This
will be increasingly true as m increases. In this case, the general analysis
is much more complicated, and should really appeal to the dynamics.
However, an approximate theory which gives good agreement with the
numerical results can be developed. The features for the case of ensembles
containing a significant number of non-flat quenched disorder matrices Ω
are as follows:
• By definition of the labels {K}, the ranking in terms of virtual-points
is retained, i.e. SK=1 >SK=2 >SK=3 >SK=4 > ... is always true.
However, the disorder in the matrix Ω distorts the number of agents
playing a given strategy away from the flat-matrix results. Hence it
is not in general true that nK=1 > nK=2 > nK=3 > nK=4 > ..., and
hence the rankings in terms of highest virtual-points and popularity
are no longer identical.
• Instead we have that nK′ > nK′′ > nK′′′ > nK′′′′ > ..., where
the label K′ need not equal 1, and K′′ need not equal 2 etc.. It is
however possible to introduce a new label {Q} which will rank the
strategies in terms of popularity, i.e.
nQ=1 > nQ=2 > nQ=3 > nQ=4 > ...,
where Q = 1 represents K′, Q = 2 represents K′′, etc.
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With this in mind, we will return to the original general form for the
volatility in Equation 18, but rewrite it slightly as follows:
σ21 =
1
4
P∑
K=1
N∑
nK=0
N∑
n
K
=0
[nK − nK ]2 P (nK , nK) (28)
=
1
8
2P∑
K=1
N∑
nK=0
N∑
n
K
=0
[nK − nK ]2 P (nK , nK)
=
1
8
2P∑
K=1
2P∑
K′=1


N∑
nK=0
N∑
nK′=0
[nK − nK′ ]2 P (nK , nK′ )

 fK′ ,K ,
where the probability that K′ = K is given by fK′,K = δK′=K and
K = 2P + 1−K. So far, this manipulation is exact.
A switch is now made to the popularity-labels {Q}. Consider any
particular strategy which was labelled previously byK and is now labelled
by Q. Unlike the case of the flat disorder matrix, it is not guaranteed that
this strategy’s anticorrelated partner will lie in position Q = 2P + 1−Q.
This is because of the relabelling operation: all that can be said is that the
strategy R has changed label from K → Q(K) while the anticorrelated
strategy has changed label from K → Q(K) and that in general Q 6=
2P + 1−Q.
As a result of the relabelling, nQ=1 > nQ=2 > nQ=3 > nQ=4 > ...
as stated earlier. Assuming that the main effect of the non-flat ma-
trix was to shuffle these numbers, as opposed to altering their values,
it can be assumed that as a zeroth-order approximation the values of
nQ=1, nQ=2, nQ=3,... etc. are still sharply peaked around the expected
values obtained for the flat-matrix case, i.e. it is assumed that the prob-
ability distribution P (nQ(K), nQ′(K)) will be sharply peaked around the
nQ(K) and nQ′(K) values given by the expected values for the (nearly
flat) quenched-disorder matrix Ω. Lets call these values nQ and nQ′
where the intrinsic dependence of Q on K has been dropped. Hence
P (nQ, nQ′) ∝ δ(nQ − nQ)δ(nQ′ − nQ′) with nQ and nQ′ given by the
box-counting method (see Figure 10 but with K,K′ replaced by Q,Q′).
The volatility becomes, after relabelling:
σ21 =
1
8
2P∑
Q=1
2P∑
Q′=1


N∑
nQ=0
N∑
nQ′=0
[nQ − nQ′ ]2 P (nQ, nQ′)

 fQ′,Q, (29)
where fQ′,Q is the probability that strategy with label Q
′ is anticorrelated
to Q. Substituting in P (nQ, nQ′) ∝ δ(nQ − nQ)δ(nQ′ − nQ′) gives
σ21 =
1
8
2P∑
Q=1
2P∑
Q′=1
[nQ − nQ′ ]2 fQ′,Q, (30)
where the function fQ′,Q, which is the probability that the strategy with
label Q′ is the anticorrelated strategy Q, still needs to be specified.
So what should the form of fQ′,Q be? In principle, it should include the
effects of market impact/dynamical feedback which develops as the game
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progresses, in addition to the effects of the disorder. An exact expression
for this term is yet to be found. However, two possibilities have been tried:
(i) assume a form that depends on m and N . This approach was first pur-
sued in Ref. [16] and gives good analytic agreement with the numerical
simulations (see later Figure 15). It will be discussed shortly.
(ii) assume that the probability that Q′ is the anticorrelated strategy Q,
is given by 1/(2P ) and is independent of the label Q′. In this sense this is
the opposite limit to the delta-function case for flat disorder matrix. In-
stead of being a delta-function at Q′ = Q = 2P +1−Q, it is said that the
anticorrelated strategy Q could be anywhere in the list of 1...2P strategies.
Case (ii) is the first approach we will pursue here. In this limiting case of
1/(2P ), one obtains
σflat f1 =
N√
3.2(m+3)/2
(1− 2−2(m+1)) 12 . (31)
Comparing this with Equation 27 it can be seen that
σflat f1 =
1√
2
σdelta f1 ≈ 0.7σdelta f1 . (32)
for the case of s = 2. It should be noted that Equation 27 can be de-
rived from Equation 30 by letting fQ′,Q take a δ-function distribution
δQ′,2m+1+1−Q peaked at Q
′ = 2m+1 + 1 − Q, hence the superscript in
Equation 27.
4.3 Non-flat quenched disorder Ω at high m
For the limit of high m, the granular nature of the disorder becomes im-
portant. In other words, the standard deviation in the number of traders
in a given bin is now similar to the mean value hence the fluctuations
(which are limited to integer numbers) are important. Note that for large
m, these integer numbers tend to be 0’s and 1’s for each box (Q,Q′). It
almost looks like the problem of fermions in energy levels - double oc-
cupancy does not occur. In this limit of high m (by high m it is meant
that the number of strategies is greater than N.s, i.e. 2.2m > N.s) there
will be N crowds each representing one strategy and one agent. In the
limit that fQ′,Q = 1/(2P ), the probability that a strategy Q representing
one agent is matched with its anticorrelated strategy in position Q also
representing one agent, is given by N/2P . The probability that a strategy
Q representing one agent is matched with its anticorrelated strategy in
position Q which represents a strategy that no agent is using, is given by
1−N/2P . Using Equation 30 then gives,
σ21 =
1
8
2P∑
Q=1
2P∑
Q′=1
[nQ − nQ′ ]2 fQ′,Q (33)
=
1
4
N∑
Q=1
{
[(nQ = 1)− (nQ′ = 1)]2 N
2P
+ [(nQ = 1)− (nQ′ = 0)]2 2P −N
2P
}
,
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where the sum is now performed over the N strategies that each have one
agent subscribed, and the second summation over Q′ has been absorbed
by the extra probabilistic factors. Simplifying this expression gives,
σflat f, high m1 =
(
1
4
N∑
Q=1
[(nQ = 1)− (nQ′ = 0)]2 2P −N
2P
) 1
2
(34)
= (
1
4
N.
2P −N
2P
)
1
2
=
√
N
2
(1− N
2m+1
)
1
2 ,
where P ≡ 2m has been used. It should be noted that σdelta f1 , σflat f1
and σflat f, high m1 , are only limits with regards to the way that the agents
are distributed amongst the elements in the quenched disorder matrix Ω.
They do not provide strict bounds on the actual standard deviation of the
numbers of agents choosing a given option in the simulation.
Figure 2 shows (small circles) σ1 as measured from the simulation for
individual quenched disorder matrices Ω, as a function of agent memory
size m. The spread in values from individual runs, for a given m, indi-
cates the extent to which the choice of Ω alters the dynamics of the MG.
The upper line at low m, is Equation 27 showing σdelta f1 . The lower
line at low m, is Equation 31 showing σflat f1 . The line at high m is
Equation 34 showing σflat f, high m1 . Figure 11 shows σ
delta f
1 , σ
flat f
1
and σflat f, high m1 , as a function of m for s = 2, 4 and 8. Comparing the
analytic curves with the numerical results seen in Figure 11, it can be seen
that these analytic expressions capture the essential physics driving the
variation in behaviour of the volatility. They have been obtained within
a static framework, confirming that the volatility does not depend in a
sensitive way on the details of the dynamics.
4.4 An investigation of strategy rankings
We now investigate more carefully the form of fQ′,Q. Recall Equation 30,
σ21 =
1
8
2P∑
Q=1
2P∑
Q′=1
[nQ − nQ′ ]2 fQ′,Q (35)
The probability distribution fQ′,Q gives the probability that the Q
′’th
most popular strategy is the anticorrelated strategy to the Q’th most
popular strategy. It has already been stated that an exact form for fQ′,Q
has yet to be found.
Figure 12 compares the theoretical values of nQ calculated using Equa-
tion 23 for s = 2 and N = 101 (dashed lines) to numerical values taken
from the MG simulation (solid lines). We have dropped the bar over
nQ for simplicity, since we are always talking about time-averages. The
agreement is good. In this comparison it is necessary to consider the gran-
ular nature of the MG: this effect becomes increasingly important as the
agents’ memory size m increases. As such, the quantities nQ are rounded
to the nearest integer to account for the fact that agents exist only as
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integer values. This is subject to the constraint that
Q=2P∑
Q=1
nQ = N. (36)
Only a limited number (call this B) terms should be included in this sum,
subject to the condition that the partial sum equals N after the quantities
nQ have been rounded to the nearest integer. In addition any nQ’s which
are less than one, are rounded up to one if Q ≤ B such that the first B
terms are all non-zero and sum to N . There are hence only B different
strategies in play; note that B ≤ 2.2m and B ≤ N . Figure 13 shows fQ′,Q
for Q = 1 as a function of Q′, taken from the numerical MG simulation
at m = 2, 5 and 10. We note the following properties:
• For small m (m = 2) the anticorrelated strategy to the most popular
strategy (i.e. Q = 1) is at Q′ = 2m+1, i.e. it is the least popular
strategy. Hence fQ′,Q resembles the δ-function limiting case men-
tioned above. Very few agents will therefore pick this anticorrelated
strategy. Hence the crowd-anticrowd cancellation will be small and
σ1 will be large, as can be seen in Figures 11 and 2.
• Asm increases (m = 5) a remarkable effect occurs: the peak in fQ′,Q
moves up toward Q′ = 1. Hence both Q = 1 and its anticorrelated
partner Q are now very popular. Whereas for m = 2 it seemed like
there was an effective ‘repulsion’ between Q and Q, for m = 5 this
now seems more like an attraction. Amusingly, the shape of fQ′,Q
for m = 5 is now reminiscent of the screening effect of a negative
charge cloud around a positive charge placed at Q = 1, or even a
bound electron-hole pair (i.e. exciton) with the crowd (anticrowd)
playing the role of the positive (negative) charge. The consequence
of this attraction which appears as m increases, is that the crowd
and anticrowd become comparable in size, yielding a significant can-
cellation and hence small volatility as observed in the Savit curve
(i.e. Figure 2).
• For large m (m = 10), the ability of the anticrowd to ‘screen’ the
crowd has decreased yielding a rather flat distribution as shown.
Hence σ1 is small for m ∼ 5−6, in agreement with Figure 2. Note that, at
intermediate m, the MG cannot fully ‘optimize’ itself by building crowds
and anticrowds of exactly equal size. This is due to the initial quenched
disorder Ω, and the random processes used to resolve the decisions of
agents in the instances when they have strategies with equal past perfor-
mance. This explains why the volatility does not go to zero at finite m,
and why the label of ‘phase transition’ to separate the small and large m
regimes in the Savit curve, is not strictly correct.
Figure 14 shows the spread of numerical values for different runs of
the MG compared to the crowd-anticrowd theoretical calculation (solid
circles) using Equation 30. In contrast to the previous theoretical curves
which used analytic expressions for the probability function fQ′,Q, the
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results for each m in Figure 14 have been obtained by generating the
corresponding fQ′,Q numerically, as in Figure 13. The agreement is very
good. The theoretical points tend to lie toward the high end of the numer-
ical spread, for example at m = 2; this can be attributed to the fact that
the theory neglects accidental degeneracies in the virtual-point ordered
list {nK}. It has been checked that including a stochastic (i.e. coin-toss)
process to break such ties, reduces the theoretical σ values down toward
the mid-point of the numerical spread.
4.5 Using approximate strategy rankings
We now return to a discussion of case (i) which was referred to earlier, and
used in Ref. [16]. It turns out to be convenient to start with Equation 19
for the squared volatility of the number of agents choosing a given option,
σ21 =
1
4
P∑
K=1
[nK − nK ]2 . (37)
It has been established that SK=1 > SK=2 > SK=2 > SK=2 > ... is
always true and that for a flat quenched disorder matrix Ω a similar
statement can be made for the numbers of agents using the K’th ranked
scoring strategy, i.e. nK=1 > nK=2 > nK=2 > nK=2 > .... It is also
guaranteed that the strategy K, which is anticorrelated to strategy K,
occupies position K = 2P +1−K in this performance-ranked list. Whilst
assuming a flat quenched disorder matrix Ω is valid at low m, it is not
however valid at high m. This is due to granular effects as the value of m
is increased. It remains true that the strategy K, which is anticorrelated
to strategy K, occupies position K = 2P + 1 − K in the performance-
ranked list, however there is no guarantee that the strategy represented
by K is even present in the game. It is possible, and indeed highly likely
at high m, that the strategy K was not picked by any of the agents at
the start of the game. For example if m = 8, there are 512 strategies in
the RSS, and for N = 101 and s = 2 there will only be up to 2 × 101 of
the 512 possible strategies actually present in the game (repetition during
initial strategy-picking is allowed).
To describe this situation, Ref. [16] introduced a probability P (K ∈
G). (We referred to this as case (i) earlier in the present paper). This
corresponds to the following probability: given that strategy K is used,
then P (K ∈ G) is the probability that strategy K is a member of the set
of strategies G that have been chosen by the agents at the start of the
game. Equation 19 is rewritten to include this probability:
σ21 =
1
4
P∑
K=1
[
nK − P (K ∈ G)nK
]2
+
1
4
P∑
K=1
[
(1− P (K ∈ G))nK
]2
. (38)
The second term in Equation 38 accounts for those strategies which are
not anti-correlated to any other strategy. We now recall Equation 23
which gives the mean number of agents when assuming a flat quenched
disorder matrix Ω:
nK = N
([
1− (K − 1)
2P
]s
−
[
1− K
2P
]s)
(39)
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Taking into account the granular nature of the game, implies that the
condition
∑K=2P
K=1 nK = N should also be imposed. Hence only G terms
in this sum should be included, subject to the condition that the partial
sum equals N after the quantities nK have been rounded to the nearest
integer. In addition, any nK ’s which are less than one, are rounded up
to one if K ≤ G such that the first G terms are all non-zero. There are
hence only G different strategies in play; note that G ≤ 2 ·2m and G ≤ N .
The probability P (K ∈ G) is now the probability that the [G+ 1−K]-th
strategy is anticorrelated to the K-th strategy and is a member of the set
G of strategies chosen by agents at the start of the game. The variance
can hence be written analytically as
σ2an =
1
4
1
2
(G−g)∑
K=1
[
nK − P (K ∈ G)nG+1−K
]2
(40)
+
1
4
1
2
(G−g)∑
K=1
[
(1− P (K ∈ G))nG+1−K
]2
+
g
4
[nG+1
2
]2,
where g = 0 if G is even and g = 1 if G is odd. The first term represents
the net effect after pairing off the agents playing anticorrelated strategies.
The second term in Equation 40 reintroduces those agents using strategies
that were assumed to be anticorrelated to some more successful strategy,
and hence were discarded unnecessarily in the first term. The third term in
Equation 40 is due to the volatility of the group which remains unpaired in
the case where the number of different strategies used in the calculation is
odd. The third term is usually negligible compared to the first two. P (K ∈
G) can be approximated by P (K ∈ G) = p for p < 1 and P (K ∈ G) = 1
for p > 1, where p = N/(2.2m). Although the form for P (K ∈ G) can be
made more accurate, the present expression is reasonable since there are
only of order N strategies out of a possible maximum of 2.2m which can
actually be in play at any one time. Hence, as expected, P (K ∈ G) is zero
when N << 2.2m and unity when N >> 2.2m. It has been checked that
the analytic results for the volatility are fairly insensitive to the precise
form of P (K ∈ G) as long as P (K ∈ G) satisifes the above criteria.
Figure 15 shows the full analytical expression for the volatility curves
(solid lines) of the number of agents choosing a given option for s = 2,
s = 4 and s = 6 with N = 101, compared with the numerical simulations
(dashed line). Note that since m is integer, the curves are not smooth.
The agreement between the analytic and numerical results is good across
a wide range of m and s values. In particular, the analytic results capture
the deepening of the minimum in the volatility as s decreases.
To summarize, these analytic approaches are approximations to the
exact theory of Equation 13. While the approximations adopted have
some subtle differences of emphasis, the resulting analytic expressions do
capture the essential physics underlying the volatility, over a wide range of
m and s values: the essence of this physics is the correlations in strategy
space and the associated crowd-anticrowd behavior.
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4.6 Reduced vs. Full Strategy Space
The volatility of the MG is qualitatively the same when played in both the
FSS and the RSS [4]. Quantitatively the volatility of the MG when played
using the RSS is very slightly larger than that of a game played using the
FSS. One may therefore ask why the MG is so similar in characteristics
when played in the RSS and the FSS, and hence why the crowd-anticrowd
theory also provides a valid description for the MG when played in the
FSS.
For a game played in the FSS there are 22
m
/2.2m distinct subsets of
strategies. Each subset can be considered as a separate RSS. Note that
the strategies that belong to a given RSS are optimally spread out across
the corresponding FSS hypercube. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the
16, m = 2 strategies across the 4 dimensional hypercube. The positions of
the strategies belonging to the RSS are such that no two strategies have a
Hamming separation less than 2m/2. The same can be said for any other
choice of RSS. Due to the nature of a RSS, then given similar strings of
past outcomes from which to score strategies over, each strategy within
the RSS attains a score in an uncorrelated or anticorrelated manner to
any other strategy in the subset. Any other RSS within the FSS will
score its strategies in a similar way, although slightly ‘out of phase’. For
example for m = 3, the first RSS to be considered could contain the strat-
egy 00001111, and the second RSS considered could contain the strategy
01001111. It is easy to see that on 7 out of 8 occasions these two strategies
would score in the same way. So, given the nature of the MG (i.e. over
a sufficient period of time in a typical game, any history is just as likely
to be followed by a ‘0’ or a ‘1’ for low m, whilst at high m cooperative
effects die off), it can be seen that these two strategies from two separate
RSS follow each other during a typical run of the game. This argument
extends across all strategies in all of the 22
m
/2.2m distinct RSS’s within
the FSS. Hence a game using the FSS behaves as if there are 2.2m clusters
of strategies and so is similar to a game played in the RSS. These clusters
form the crowds and anticrowds of the theory and this clustering allows
the use of just one RSS in the analysis of the MG.
We note that the present crowd-anticrowd theory, even within its RSS
formulation, also provides a quantitative theory [20] to explain the sur-
prising suppression of volatility observed numerically for the ‘Thermal
Minority Game’ (TMG) [30]. In the TMG agents choose between their
strategies using an exponential probability weighting. This reduction in
σ for stochastic strategies seems fairly general: for example, the earlier
work of Ref. [26] provided a modified MG in which agents with stochastic
strategies also generate a smaller-than-random σ. We have shown [20]
that incorporating stochastic strategy-use tends to increase the crowd-
anticrowd cancellation by segregating the population into two opposite
groups, thereby increasing the amount of crowd-anticrowd segregation.
This reduces σ below the random coin-toss limit. In addition we have
shown [21] how the theory also works for a mixed population of such
‘thermal’ agents and non-thermal agents (i.e. T = 0). We refer to Refs.
[20] and [21] for a detailed discussion and graphs showing the good quanti-
tative agreement between the Crowd-Anticrowd theory and the numerical
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results. We also note that in Ref. [26], which features the MG variant
in which agents have purely stochastic strategies, it is shown that crowd-
anticrowd formation arises as a natural consequence of agents’ adaptation
in this competitive multi-agent game.
To our knowledge, there is no other analytic theory which can match
the range of quantitative agreement for these models. This suggests that
the Crowd-Anticrowd theory is an important milestone in such multi-
agent systems, and possibly even for Complex Systems in general. It is
also pleasing from the point of view of physics methodology, since the
basic underlying philosophy of accounting correctly for ‘inter-strategy’
correlations is already known to be successful in more conventional areas
of many-body physics. This raises the interesting possibility that conven-
tional many-body physics might be open to re-interpretation in terms of
an appropriate multi-particle ‘game’: we leave this for future work.
5 Conclusion
We have given an in-depth presentation of the Crowd-Anticrowd the-
ory in order to understand the time-averaged and configuration-averaged
fluctuations in the MG system. The quantitative success of the Crowd-
Anticrowd theory means that much of the time-averaged and ensemble-
averaged properties of such MG-like systems can be understood without
having to solve the detailed game dynamics. Since the theory depends on
structure in strategy space, as opposed to the minority character of the
game, we believe that the Crowd-Anticrowd theory will have applicability
for more general multi-agent systems. In particular, we are currently in-
vestigating the modifications that need to be made to the theory when the
game is placed on a network, or there is some form of local connectivity
between some (or all) agents. These findings will be reported elsewhere.
We believe that the Crowd-Anticrowd concept might serve as a fun-
damental theoretical concept for more general Complex Systems which
mimic competitive multi-agent games. Obviously there will be some
properties of MG games which cannot be described using such time- and
configuration-averaged theories as used here. In particular, any observa-
tion of a real-world Complex System which is thought to resemble a multi-
agent game, will more likely to correspond to a single run which evolves
from a specific initial configuration of agents’ strategies. This implies a
particular Ω, hence the time-averagings within the Crowd-Anticrowd the-
ory must be carried out for that particular choice of Ω [33]. We refer to
Refs. [23, 24] for a detailed discussion of such run-specific dynamics. In
order to study time-dependent properties in more general systems, a dy-
namical form of the crowd-anticrowd approach can be developed in which
the time-dependence of the crowd-anticrowd sizes is included specifically.
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FIGURE CAPTIONS
FIGURE 1Minority Game (MG): at timestep t, each agent decides whether
to enter a game where the choices are option 1 and option 0. A total of
n0(t) agents choose 0 while n1(t) choose 1, with n0(t) + n1(t) = N .
FIGURE 2 Volatility (small circles) as measured from individual runs of
numerical simulations, as a function of agent memory size m with s = 2
and N = 101. Each run corresponds to a randomly-chosen quenched
disorder matrix Ω. Upper line at low m is Equation 27 showing σdelta f1 .
Lower line at low m, is Equation 31 showing σflat f1 . Line at high m
is Equation 34 showing σflat f, high m1 . Dashed line is random coin-toss
limit.
FIGURE 3 An m = 2 strategy space together with some example strate-
gies (left). The strategy space shown is known as the ‘Full Strategy Space’,
FSS, and contains all possible permutations of the binary options 0 and
1 for each history. There are 22
m
strategies in this space. The 2m dimen-
sional hypercube (right) shows all 22
m
strategies from the full strategy
space at its vertices.
FIGURE 4 Examples of the de Bruijn graph for m = 1, 2, and 3. The
probability that the outcome at time t+ 1 will be a 1 (or 0) depends on
the state at time t.
FIGURE 5 Example distribution for the tensor Ω describing the strategy
allocation for N = 101 agents in the case of m = 2, and s = 2 in the
reduced strategy space RSS.
FIGURE 6 Qualitative explanation of the competition between crowd-
anticrowd sizes as a function of m. The group of agents whose highest
strategy is R, provides a crowd since they will all use the same strategy
at a particular time-step (and hence act in the same way regardless of the
particular history bit-string at that timestep). Upper panel: run-averaged
version of Figure 2, showing the run-averaged volatility of the number of
agents choosing a particular option as a function of the memory size m.
FIGURE 7. Proof-of-concept of Crowd-Anticrowd approach. Graph shows
volatility for the Minority Game as a function of memory size m, for
s = 2, 3, 4 strategies per agent, and N = 101 agents. Solid curve: numer-
ical simulation. Dashed curve: Crowd-Anticrowd theory, evaluated nu-
merically using Equation 13. Random (coin-toss) limit σ =
√
N/2 = 5.0
is indicated.
FIGURE 8 Schematic representation of how the scores of three strategies
and their three anti-correlated partners, might vary in time.
FIGURE 9 Same as Figure 8, but with strategies now ranked in terms of
virtual-point ranking K. Hence shows the variation of the scores of the
two top scoring strategies from Figure 8.
FIGURE 10 Schematic representation of Ω with m = 2, s = 2, in the
RSS. The strategies are ranked according to the value of K. The shaded
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elements represent those agents whose highest scoring strategy is ranked
4’th highest in score, i.e. K = 4.
FIGURE 11 Analytic forms of volatilities σdelta f1 , σ
flat f
1 and σ
flat f, high m
1 ,
as a function of m for s = 2, 4 and 8. Also shown are the numerical val-
ues obtained from different simulation runs (triangles, crosses and circles).
The results for s = 2 are the same as Figure 2.
FIGURE 12 Comparison between the theoretical values of nQ calculated
using Equation 23 for s = 2 and N = 101 (dashed lines) and the numerical
values taken from the MG simulation (solid lines).
FIGURE 13 Form of fQ′,Q for Q = 1 as a function of Q
′, taken from the
numerical MG simulation at m = 2, 5 and 10.
FIGURE 14 Volatility as a function of memory m for s = 2 and N =
101. The spread of numerical values for different runs of the MG (open
circles) is compared to the Crowd-Anticrowd theoretical calculation using
Equation 30 with numerically obtained values of fQ′,Q (solid circles).
FIGURE 15 Analytic theory for the volatility curves (solid lines: see Sec-
tion 4.3) for s = 2, s = 4 and s = 6 with N = 101. Numerical simulations
(dashed line) also shown, averaged over a limited number of runs (hence
the jaggedness).
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